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This thesis examines micro-level borrowing, saving, 
and consumption behavior of the poor in the United 
States. The four chapters ofthis thesis address several 
important policy-relevant issues related to the well-
being of the poor, including the ability of households to 
maintain well-being during unemployment; the well-
being of single mothers transitioning from welfare to 
work; and the impacts of welfare reform on saving. 
Chapter 1 examines whether credit markets help 
poor households maintain well-being during spells of 
unemployment. Recent research has suggested that 
unsecured debt such as credit cards can help poor 
households insure against earnings variation-a role 
traditionally served by public welfare programs. To 
address this question I use data from two nationally 
representative surveys to examine how consumption 
and borrowing respond to transitOlY spells of 
unemployment. The results provide strong evidence 
that low-asset households are constrained from 
unsecured credit markets, suggesting that these credit 
markets are not a safety net for the most disadvantaged 
households. In addition, evidence of excess sensitivity 
of consumption suggests that many households are not 
fully insured against shortfalls in income during 
unemployment. 
The second chapter addresses the issue of why the 
poor in the United States tend to have very low rates of 
saving. I consider whether eligibility requirements 
under public transfer programs affect the asset holdings 
of the poor. Variation in eligibility rules over time and 
across states provides a natural experiment that is 
exploited to examine the effects of these rules on 
household asset holdings-in particular, vehicle assets. 
Concems about transportation for low-income 
households have risen as recent changes in welfare 
policy have placed significant emphasis on the 
importance of work. Most recipients are now required 
to work in order to maintain eligibility. Owning a car to 
commute to work, however, may violate eligibility 
rules. This creates a potential obstacle to employment 
for those transitioning from welfare to work. I find that 
restrictions on vehicle equity have had a measurable 
effect on the probability of owning a vehicle for 
households with significant exposure to welfare. 
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Chapter 3, which is a joint effort with Bruce Meyer, 
evaluates the merit of consumption and income 
measures ofthe material well-being of the poor. We 
begin with conceptual and pragmatic reasons that favor 
income or consumption. Then, we empirically examine 
the quality of standard data by studying measurement 
error and underreporting, and by comparing micro-data 
from standard surveys to administrative micro-data and 
aggregates. We also compare low reports of income and 
consumption to other independent measures of 
hardship and well-being. While income is 
predominantly used as a measure of well-being for the 
poor, the evidence we present supports a stronger 
consideration of consumption. The closer links between 
consumption, well-being, and its better measurement 
for poor households favors the use of consumption 
when setting benefits and evaluating transfer programs. 
The final chapter, which is also a collaborative effort 
with Bruce Meyer, examines how the dramatic changes 
in tax and welfare policies in the 1980s and 1990s 
affected the material well-being oflow-educated single 
mothers. During this period, transfer income fell 
noticeably for these women, but eamings increased 
because more single mothers were working. Building 
off of the analysis in Chapter 3, we use consumption to 
capture changes in well-being over time. Using data 
from both the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics, we find that the 
material conditions of single mothers did not decline in 
recent years, either in absolute telms or relative to 
comparison groups. This pattern holds for the average 
single mother as well as for low-educated single 
mothers at low quantiles of the consumption 
distribution. In most cases, our evidence suggests that 
the material conditions of single mothers have 
improved slightly. 
Chapter 1 
Borrowing During Unemployment: Unsecured 
Debt as a Safety Net 
Chapter 1 explores two questions related to a 
household's ability to maintain its well-being during 
unemployment: Does unsecured debt help households 
supplement lost eamings during unemployment, and 
does limited access to such credit have important 
welfare implications? These questions are of 
considerable cone em to policymakers, given the large 
literature showing that poor households are not fully 
insured against unemployment spells (Dynarski and 
Gruber 1997). Moreover, these questions have become 
particularly relevant in the United States as consumers 
increasingly rely on unsecured debt to finance 
consumption. During the 1980s and 1990s, there was 
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tremendous growth in unsecured debt for U.S. 
households. Average household balances on unsecured 
loans doubled in real terms between 1984 and 1999. By 
1998, more than 75 percent of all U.S. households had 
at least one credit card and nearly half of all households 
carried outstanding balances on these accounts. Growth 
in credit card debt has been most striking among 
households below the poverty line. Some researchers 
suggest that these poor households use this debt to 
smooth consumption across spells of unemployment 
(Bird, Hagstrom, and Wild 1999). The issue of how 
poor households maintain consumption during 
unemployment is particularly interesting at a time when 
other traditional safety nets, such as Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC) or Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), are narrowing 
their coverage by imposing time limits and/or work 
requirements. 
To address these empirical questions, I use panel 
data from two nationally representative surveys-the 
Survey ofIncome and Program Participation (SIPP) 
and the Panel Study ofIncome Dynamics (PSID)-to 
examine whether borrowing and consumption are 
responsive to transitory spells of unemployment. I 
allow for heterogeneity in access to credit markets by 
looking at households with different levels of initial 
assets. I also consider the borrowing behavior of low-
asset households separately because these households 
cannot use savings to self-insure against income 
shortfalls. Thus, unsecured debt is the only mechanism 
by which these low-asset households can transfer 
income intertemporally. Exploiting a rich set of 
information in the data about the nature of 
unemployment spells, I identify spells which are both 
unexpected and transitory. I then use these spells to 
capture the effect of unemployment-induced earnings 
variation on borrowing behavior in an instrumental 
variables model. 
I find that households with some initial wealth do in 
fact borrow during unemployment spells, increasing 
unsecured debt by an average of 10 cents for each 
dollar of earnings lost. By contrast, households with 
low initial wealth do not use unsecured debt to 
supplement lost earnings. Sensitivity analysis shows 
that these findings are robust to many different 
specifications. 
To address the related question of whether restricted 
access to these credit markets has negative welfare 
implications for households facing an income shortfall, 
I examine how consumption responds to these 
transitory unemployment spells. I again consider 
whether the response differs for households with and 
without assets. The results show that the consumption 
oflow-asset households is more responsive than that of 
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households with assets. Moreover, sensitivity analyses 
show that these differences cannot be entirely 
explained by heterogeneity in the nature of 
unemployment shocks across asset groups, or by 
disparities in the income elasticity of consumption at 
different levels of permanent income. 
The analysis in this chapter is the first to test 
empirically the extent to which households borrow 
fi'om unsecured credit markets to supplement lost 
earnings. The results provide strong evidence that 
current credit markets are not a viable safety net for 
low-asset households. The fact that consumption falls 
in response to transitory spells of unemployment 
suggests that these low-asset households are short on 
liquidity during unemployment. It also indicates that 
the unemployment insurance program does not 
sufficiently insure low-asset households against 
earnings shortfalls. Moreover, differences in the 
responses of consumption to unemployment for 
households with and without assets imply that low-
asset households experience greater losses in material 
well-being due to restricted access to unsecured credit. 
Addressing these concerns, some researchers have 
suggested adding a loan provision to the unemployment 
insurance program (Flemming 1978). Adverse 
incentive effects, however, are lilcely to confound any 
policy aimed at providing credit to unemployed 
workers who are constrained from private credit 
markets. The design of a policy to extend credit to the 
unemployed would benefit from further research to 
address concerns about moral hazard and other 
potential adverse effects of extending credit to 
unemployed workers. 
Chapter 2 
The Effects of Welfare Reform on Saving 
and Vehicle Ownership for the Poor 
Recent research has clearly shown that low-income 
households in the United States do not save (Orszag 
2001). What is less clear is the reason for this lack of 
saving. One potential cause is the structure of public 
transfer programs (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes 
1995). All of the major U.S. transfer programs targeted 
for low-income households, including TANF, Food 
Stamps, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI), are means tested-eligibility requires a 
recipient's income and assets to be below a specified 
level. Some assets, such as vehicles, have exemptions 
that allow households to exclude a certain amount of 
equity in that asset from the asset test. Asset limits may 
encourage potential recipients to keep few assets in 
order to satisfy asset tests. Similarly, asset exemptions 
may encourage low-income households to hold certain 
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types of assets, affecting not only saving rates but asset 
allocation, as well. 
There are several reasons why policymakers are 
concerned with the saving behavior of the poor. First, 
low saving rates may make it more difficult for poor 
households to invest in education, own a home, or 
make other significant investments in physical or 
human capital. This will be particularly true ifthese 
poor households do not have access to perfect credit 
markets, as is suggested in Chapter 1. Second, without 
a buffer of savings, poor households are not self-
insured against income shortfalls, and these households 
may consequently become more dependent on public 
transfer programs. Some researches have suggested that 
low saving rates among the poor limit economic 
mobility, exacerbating the cycle of poverty (Sherraden 
1991). Recently, programs have been designed to 
encourage saving among the poor. For example, many 
states have provided funding for Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs). These accounts match 
savings withdrawals that are used for homeownership, 
education, or small business investments. 
Chapter 2 examines whether asset restrictions under 
the AFDC/TANF program have affected the asset 
holdings-in particular, vehicle assets-of poor 
households. There are several important reasons to 
focus on vehicle equity in this context. First, vehicles 
make up a very significant share of total wealth for 
households with limited resources. These poor 
households are more likely to have vehicle equity than 
any other type of asset. Second, restrictions on vehicle 
assets may particularly affect welfare recipients 
transitioning into the labor force. Under these reforms, 
welfare recipients are expected to work in order to be 
eligible for benefits. However, if a potential welfare 
recipient purchases a vehicle in order to conunute to 
work, this person may consequently fail the asset test 
for eligibility under AFDC/TANF. Lack of adequate 
means oftransportation has often been cited by welfare 
recipients as a major obstacle to employment. Two-
thirds of all newly created jobs are located in the 
suburbs, but 75 percent of all welfare recipients live in 
urban cities or rural areas. Third, exemptions for 
vehicle equity may distort asset allocation, encouraging 
households to substitute vehicle equity for other types 
of assets. For example, more than 20 states currently 
exempt from the asset test the full value of at least one 
vehicle. These exemptions may induce poor households 
to substitute vehicle assets for financial assets. This 
may impede savings growth for these households, as 
vehicle equity tends to depreciate more rapidly than 
more liquid assets. Lastly, the variation in vehicle 
exemptions over time and across states far exceeds the 
changes in the limits governing other assets, suggesting 
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that policy changes may be particularly important for 
vehicle equity. Nevertheless, the effects of asset 
restrictions on vehicle ownership have been largely 
overlooked in previous research. 
In theory, the effect of asset restrictions on saving 
behavior is not clear. The effect of these high implicit 
tax rates on asset holdings will depend on the 
household's existing asset portfolio and likelihood of 
participating in these transfer programs. For example, 
relaxing asset restrictions may encourage saving for 
likely participants with few assets, because these 
households can accumulate more assets while still 
satisfying the asset test. On the other hand, for some 
households with asset holdings above the original asset 
limits, the more relaxed asset limits make the transfer 
program more attractive. These households may find it 
optimal to reduce asset holdings in order to maintain 
the option of participating in the program. Because 
some assets are partially exempt from the asset tests, 
these restrictions can also affect asset allocation. 
Although the overall effect of asset restrictions on asset 
holdings is ambiguous in theory, empirical analysis can 
provide evidence on the true effect of these restrictions. 
Using data on vehicle assets from the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CE), I examine the response of 
asset holdings to changes in asset restrictions, 
exploiting two different sources of exogenous variation 
in these restrictions: 1) the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, which established more 
uniform restrictions on liquid assets across states, and 
much more rigid limits on vehicle equity; and 2) federal 
waivers which gave states greater freedom to set 
program rules in the 1990s, resulting in an increase in 
the limits set on both liquid assets and vehicle equity in 
some states. I estimate probit models that control for 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across states. 
Although the analysis of the effects of the federal 
overhaul of the asset test rules in the early 1980s are 
inconclusive, I find fairly strong evidence that the 
loosening of asset restrictions in the 1990s resulted in 
greater holdings of vehicle assets for low-educated 
single mothers. For example, vehicle limits reduce the 
probability of owning a car by 13 percent for low-
educated single mothers. A $1000 increase in the 
vehicle limit results in a 6.7 percent increase in vehicle 
ownership rates. 
Chapter 3 
Measuring the Well-Being of the Poor Using 
Income and Consumption 
Chapter 3, written with Bruce Meyer, examines the 
quality of income and consumption measures of 
material well-being. Income is almost exclusively used 
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to measure economic deprivation in the United States. 
For families with limited resources, where the extent of 
material deprivation is most important, there is little 
evidence to support the reliability of income measures. 
Moreover, there is significant evidence suggesting that 
income is badly measured for the poor. In developing 
countries, unlike the United States, consumption is the 
standard measure of material well-being. While there 
are obvious differences between developing and 
developed countries, such as the extent offonnal 
employment, these distinctions are blurred when 
looking at the poor in developed countries who may do 
little fonnal work. Also, there are reasons to believe 
that consumption is better-measured than income for 
poor families. 
This chapter considers both conceptual and 
measurement issues, and compares income and 
consumption measures to other measures of hardship or 
material well-being. Our analysis begins by exploring 
the conceptual and pragmatic reasons why 
consumption might be better or worse than income. We 
then consider several empirical strategies to examine 
the quality of income and consumption data. 
We show that conceptual arguments regarding 
whether income or consumption is a better measure of 
material well-being of the poor almost always favor 
consumption. Consumption captures pennanent 
income, reflects the insurance value of government 
programs and credit markets, better accommodates 
illegal activity and price changes, and is more likely to 
reflect private and government in-kind transfers which 
are particularly important sources of support for 
families with low cash incomes. For example, recent 
changes in Medicaid are likely to substantially affect 
family well-being without affecting measured family 
income. On the other hand, non-medical consumption 
measures would reflect Medicaid changes. If single 
mothers spend less out-of-pocket on health care, they 
can spend more on food and housing or other goods and 
servIces. 
Reporting arguments for income or consumption are 
more evenly split. For many households, income is 
easier to report (particularly when it comes from one 
source). Findings by Bound and Krueger (1991) 
support the idea that income is easy to report-more 
than 40 percent of Current Population Survey (CPS) 
respondents report earnings that are within 2.5 percent 
of IRS earnings. This argument is probably the main 
reason why most surveys rely on income measures and 
it is persuasive for many demographic groups. 
Consumption, on the other hand, often has a large 
number of components, and therefore, may be difficult 
to report. 
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However, for some demographic groups that are 
particularly important from a poverty and public policy 
perspective, such as low-educated single mothers, this 
argument is not compelling. For low-educated single 
mothers, income often comes from many other sources 
besides earnings in fonnal employment. For these 
disadvantaged families, transfer income (which is 
consistently underreported in surveys) and off-the-
books income (which is likely to be umeported in 
surveys) account for a greater fraction of total income. 
With many sources of income that do not appear on a 
W-2 statement, accurate reporting is much less likely. 
Furthennore, households with limited resources tend to 
spend a large fraction of their resources on only a few 
consumption categories, namely food and housing. 
Food and housing together constitute nearly 70 percent 
of the consumption of low-educated single mothers, 
and thus provide a reasonable measure of material well-
being. This suggests that consumption may be easier to 
report than income for these households-an argument 
supported by ethnographic research (Edin and Lein 
1997). 
We employ several different empirical strategies that 
show that income is underreported and measured with 
substantial error, especially for those with few 
resources such as low-educated single mothers. 
Expenditures for those near the bottom decile greatly 
exceed reported income. Households in the bottom 
decile of the income distribution outspend their 
disposable income by more than a factor of four. We 
also show that these differences between expenditures 
and income cannot be explained with evidence of 
borrowing or drawing down wealth, as these families 
rarely have substantial assets or debts. 
We provide evidence that commonly used household 
surveys have substantial underreporting of key 
components of income. Weighted micro-data from 
these surveys, when compared to administrative 
aggregates, show that govemment transfers and other 
income components that are particularly important for 
those with few resources are severely underreported. 
For example, cash welfare, which accounts for more 
than a quarter oftotal income for single mothers in the 
bottom decile of the income distribution, is 
underreported by about a third in the CPS. 
Furthennore, the degree of under-reporting has 
changed over time and these changes in underreporting 
are arguably correlated with policy changes, because 
the refonns have encouraged people to move towards 
greater involvement in the fonnallabor market. There 
is also some underreporting of expenditures, but 
because expenditures often exceed income, we might 
be more concerned about over-reporting of 
consumption, of which there is little evidence. Also, 
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underreporting of consumption is not likely to be 
correlated with policy changes. 
Finally, we compare other independent measures of 
material hardship or adverse family outcomes for those 
with very low consumption or income. These material 
hardships are more severe for those with low 
consumption than for those with low income, 
indicating that consumption does a better job of 
capturing well-being for disadvantaged families. 
Both conceptual arguments and empirical evidence 
present a strong case for consumption. Our analysis 
suggests that consumption should be used more often in 
studies of the well-being of disadvantaged households. 
We also argue that the closer link between consumption 
and well-being (and its better measurement for poor 
households) favors the use of the former when setting 
benefits and evaluating transfer programs. 
Chapter 4 
The Effects of Welfare and Tax Reform: The 
Material Well-Being of Single Mothers in 
the 1980s and 1990s 
Chapter 3 provides the motivation for using 
consumption in Chapter 4, also written with Bruce 
Meyer, to analyze the effects of welfare and tax reform 
on the material well-being of single mothers. Recently, 
state and federal policymakers dramatically changed 
tax and transfer programs for single mothers. Perhaps 
most notable were the overhaul of the federal welfare 
program in 1996 and the expansions in the earned 
income tax credit in the early to mid 1990s. These 
changes encouraged work and discouraged welfare 
receipt, and the results have been quite noticeable. 
Welfare caseloads declined by more than 40 percent in 
the four years after their peak in March of 1994, and the 
increases in employment and earnings of single 
mothers sharply accelerated after 1993. The goal of this 
final chapter is to examine the material conditions of 
single mothers and their families before and soon after 
welfare and tax reform in order to assess the net effects 
ofrecent policy changes on the well-being ofthese 
families. 
Using data from the CE and the PSID, we examine 
the consumption patterns of single mothers and their 
families. We examine both absolute changes in the 
consumption of single mothers and changes relative to 
those for two comparison groups: single women 
without children and married mothers. We estimate 
quantile regressions at both the 15th and 25th 
percentiles of the consumption distribution in order to 
capture the effect of these reforms for more 
disadvantaged households. 
2003 Dissertation Summaries 
Our results show that the level oftotal consumption 
for single mothers increases in real terms throughout 
this period. In relative terms, there is some evidence 
that consumption for single mothers near the bottom of 
the consumption distribution increased over the 1990s, 
and this increase is also noticeable for less skilled 
single mothers. In most cases, we see a statistically 
significant increase in relative total consumption for 
single mothers between 1984-1990 and 1996-2000. 
Our results also show that some of these gains in 
consumption for single mothers occur after 1995, but 
these changes are quite small and in many cases they 
are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, we 
provide strong evidence that the material well-being of 
single mothers has not appreciably declined as a result 
of recent reforms. 
Our evaluation of the effects of welfare reform adds 
to the existing literature in several ways. First, by 
looking at all single mothers, as opposed to only those 
on welfare, we are able to capture both the direct effect 
of reforms on current and past recipients, as well as 
effects on those induced not to receive welfare. Second, 
we use household consumption to evaluate the effects 
of welfare reform on the well-being of single mothers. 
The arguments for why consumption is a better 
measure of material well-being than income are 
explained in Chapter 3. Third, rather than just looking 
at levels of consumption, we compare the consumption 
behavior of single mothers to two separate comparison 
groups. Assuming other economic changes that 
occurred in the past decade affected both single 
mothers and the comparison groups similarly, this 
approach enables us to isolate the effects of welfare and 
tax changes. Lastly, we are able to strengthen these 
initial findings by analyzing consumption behavior 
from two independent data sources. The similar 
patterns of consumption changes that emerge from the 
PSID and the CE suggest that our results are fairly 
robust. 
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